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On Wal-Mart:
Doing Good by Doing Nothing
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN
The major success of Wal-Mart has brought forth an unprecedented
amount of criticism of the firm and its business practices. In this Article I
subject Wal-Mart's critics to the same scrutiny that they bring to the firm
itself, and conclude that virtually all of their charges are overblown and
misdirected. In emphasizing the supposed dislocations that Wal-Mart's
has had on the settled expectations of certain communities, the critics fail
to take into account the positive benefits that the firm supplies its
customers in the form of quality goods at low prices and the positive
spillovers they provide by revitalizing poor or marginal neighborhoods. In
stressing the dislocation that Wal-Mart creates for its competitors, the
critics misapply the antitrust laws to competitive situations where they
should play no role, or they propose various forms of intervention in
matters of wage, health or land use regulation that serve the exclusionary
interests of rival unionized firms contrary to overall social welfare. In
relying on empirical studies, the critics overlook innocuous explanations of
the supposedly negative effects of Wal-Mart's practices. Without some
evidence that the firm has used deception or monopoly power, the
proposed remedies for its alleged misdeeds result in expending public
funds to reduce social welfare. Wal-Mart is not, and should not be
immune to competitive pressures, to which it has yielded ground in recent
years. But under no circumstances should it, or other big-box retailers, be
singled out for special treatment. As is so often the case, the best
government response to rapid changes in the business environment is to do
nothing at all.
HeinOnline  -- 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1287 2006-2007
ARTICLE CONTENTS
I. THE FALL FROM GRACE ...................................................... 1289
II. CRITIQUING THE CRITICS ................................................... 1291
A. IS WAL-MART GOOD FOR AMERICA? .................. .. . . .. . . . .. . .. 1292
B. THE ECONOMIC STUDIES AGAINST WAL-MART ............... 1295
III. A CLASH OF WORLD VISIONS ........................................... 1304
HeinOnline  -- 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1288 2006-2007
On Wal-Mart:
Doing Good by Doing Nothing
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
I. THE FALL FROM GRACE
Most Americans harbor a deep ambivalence about the success of the
rich and famous. Often our pundits, authors, and political leaders love to
praise our bold inventors and entrepreneurs whose imagination, talent and
drive has helped make America great. As a youth, I recall reading the
heroic biographies of such folk icons as Thomas Edison and the Wright
brothers. I vividly remember in my own lifetime how Jonas Salk was
elevated to sainthood for his discovery of the polio vaccine that halted a
dreaded scourge that left many paralyzed. More recently, Bill Gates has
attained legendary status with his youthful exploits in the founding of
Microsoft. But often the worm turns, so that our inventive and
entrepreneurial heroes become tarnished with age. Edison may well have
been a folk hero, but he was also a jealous guardian of his patent rights,
and the various companies named after him, including Commonwealth and
Consolidated Edison, have taken their fair share of abuse over the years. A
similar fate awaited the Wright brothers, with their disputes with Glenn
Curtis, and Salk had his battle with Michael Sabin. Most recently, Bill
Gates faced endless travails under the antitrust laws.
It is worth asking what accounts for this cycle whereby fame leads to
resentment. Let me hazard a guess here. On the way up everyone loves
the underdog who defies the odds and introduces new technologies that
expand hope and possibilities for all citizens. But once the Wunderkinds
reach the top, our social critics always fret with their former idols when
they flirt with patent monopolies, rate regulation, and the antitrust laws. In
large part, the belated hostile response stems from the simple and
understandable fact that young heroes often take dubious actions in their
later years in order to hold on to the fruits of their youth.
Our complex love/hate relationship with larger-than-life figures does
much to shape the current controversies that swell over Wal-Mart and
other big-box stores, which have received so much publicity, and abuse, in
recent years. Sam Walton, even in death, has followed the descending arc
from saint to devil. His large role in the rise of Wal-Mart is of course well
. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago; Peter
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. I would like to thank Corina Wilder for
her research assistance in preparing this Article.
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known. Walton opened his first store in Rogers, Arkansas in July of 1962.1
From the outset, he hammered home his mantra of "Everyday Low Prices."
He knew that low prices required low costs, and so he was tough in
negotiating with suppliers, and was steadfast in his opposition to a strong
non-unionized workforce. His new firm was incorporated in 1969 and
listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1972.2 By Walton's death in
1992, the company had become the largest retailer in the United States, and
its torrid growth has continued since then, so that today the company is the
second-largest corporation in the world, trailing only ExxonMobil (whose
revenues fluctuate much more widely owing to the high variation in the
price of oil).3 For its fiscal year that ended in 2006, Wal-Mart had gross
sales of nearly $316 billion, or about 2.5% of U.S. GDP, on which it
earned around $11.2 billion in profits, for a profit margin on sales of
around 3.5%, and a market capitalization of around $200 billion (or less
than twenty times earnings).4 It also employs around 1,800,000 people
whom it calls, somewhat tendentiously, its "associates."5
It is not surprising that Wal-Mart's take-no-prisoners attitude has
generated a huge uproar from its many activists and union critics. Its tough
position on wages illustrates, and perhaps exacerbates, the gaps between
rich and poor. In a nation where economic success is fair game for
political action, Wal-Mart presents a huge target of opportunity. Wake Up
Wal-Mart, which is funded by the United Food and Commercial Workers
International Union, is unstinting in its denunciation of the practices of the
firm.6 Another organization with a similar agenda is Wal-Mart Watch,
which is funded by the Service Employees International Union.7 These
skilled and hardened political adversaries are in this battle for the long
haul.
In one sense, however, the focus on Wal-Mart is odd because right
now Wal-Mart is beset with stronger competition at home and abroad than
at any time in its forty-four year history. Size in this regard is not an
advantage. While it might be possible to grow a corporation with $30
billion in annual sales into one with $300 billion, Wal-Mart cannot
duplicate that level of expansion over the next forty-four years, even if it
, Wal-Mart Stores, Timeline, http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=6
(last visited Jan. 17, 2007).2 1d.
3 1d.
4 Id.; see also CIA, Rank Order-GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), in THE WORLD FACTBOOK
(2006), available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html.
' Alex Biesada, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., HOOVERS, http://www.hoovers.com/wal-mart/--ID_
1 1600--/free-co-factsheet.xhtrl.
6 Liza Featherstone, Wal-Mart's P.R. War, SALON.COM, Aug. 2, 2005, http://dir.salon.com/
story/news/feature/2005/08/02/walmart/index.html.
7 Christopher Leonard, Wal-Mart Watch Keeping Close Eye on Titan, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETrE, June 5, 2005, available at LEXIS, News Library, ARKDEM File.
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walks on water. The explanation involves the simple mathematics of
mature firms. One big innovation can propel a $100 million firm into a
billion dollar corporation. But that same billion-dollar innovation becomes
a rounding error for a large corporation with $300 billion in sales. This
larger corporation needs to hit a whole succession of homeruns to make
any dramatic impact on its overall profile. And the leaders of the next
generation with these billion dollar ideas will start their own firm (Google)
and not work for last generation's industry leader (Microsoft).
Wal-Mart is no exception to the inexorable law against exponential
growth. Just look at some instructive particulars. As is well understood,
the firm has saturated its initial rural base, and hence cannot expect to
continue its out-sized rate of growth solely by moving aggressively or
imaginatively in its traditional strongholds. So it has to strike out in
different directions. Every day brings more reports of flat sales during the
key holiday season-due perhaps in part to the political campaigns leveled
against it. Nonetheless, its business strategy is far from being beyond
reproach. Its overseas efforts in both Germany and Korea have floundered
against stout competition by local competitors who have a better sense of
their indigenous markets.8 In the United States, Wal-Mart has not been
able to pursue a consistent strategy for upgrading its merchandise to
compete with stores like Target (which, no surprise, has enjoyed greater
growth albeit from a smaller base) that have nabbed the cohort of more
upscale customers. As is often the case, the effort to expand the brand
often alienates core customers by blurring a once clear set of expectations.
And for a juggernaut Wal-Mart has not done well in the stock market
either, for in the past several years the stock price has been at best
unchanged.9 To this outsider, Wal-Mart looks less like a 900-pound gorilla
and more like a fighter who, while still formidable, has lost its cutting edge
as the great innovator. Ah, maturity!
II. CRITIQUING THE CRITICS
In light of this background, the horde of Wal-Mart critics have to
perpetuate their false image of Wal-Mart's market invulnerability in order
to rally their supporters. Oftentimes, they do so by making outsized claims
that only their passionate protest activities stand between the nation and its
economic oblivion. The harsh charges warrant serious response. In order
to make this evaluation, it is instructive to look at three separate issues.
The first task involves making an assessment of the global consequences of
8 Mark Landler, Wal-Mart to Abandon Germany, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at CI, available at
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
9 Gregory A. Patterson, Drooping Wal-Mart Sales Might Mean More Sales, MINN. STAR TRIB.,
Nov. 28, 2006, available at LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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Wal-Mart's ascent in retail markets, which in turn requires estimating the
impact its activities have on the usual cast of characters: customers,
suppliers, employees, and competitors. Indeed, in principle, this analysis
could extend to the second generation so that it embraces the customers,
suppliers, employees, and competitors of Wal-Mart's customers, suppliers,
employees, and competitors. The second task, which follows hard on the
heels of the first, is to critique two central charges raised against Wal-Mart.
The first asks about the soundness of the antitrust critique of Wal-Mart for
the abuse of its dominant market position. The second looks at the efforts
to alter the terms of the contracts that Wal-Mart has with its employees,
chiefly with regard to the minimum wage. Once these tasks are completed,
I offer in conclusion some more general observations on the strong
differences in intellectual mindset that separate Wal-Mart's many critics
from its far fewer defenders. It turns out that even egalitarians should be
uneasy about joining forces with Wal-Mart's single-minded pursuers.
A. Is Wal-Mart Good for America?
The first critique of Wal-Mart is not directed at any of its specific
practices. Instead it asserts that the rapid expansion of the firm is bad for
America because of the way in which it upsets settled practices and
expectations, and disrupts the lives of other groups and businesses with its
aggressive market practices. In a strong sense, this challenge is misguided
from the get-go. It is unwise to challenge Wal-Mart for its successes in the
same way that it is unwise to challenge other businesses and social
organizations for their successes. All that is needed to acquit any
successful firm or organization of charges of social misbehavior is to know
that it has operated within the rules of the game, without the benefit of
subsidy from either its competitors or the public at large.1° The defense of
successful businesses within competitive markets should look only to
certain general stylized reasons, and no further. First, as noted above, their
contracts produce gains to both parties. To be sure, not every contract
succeeds in fact, but these are all positive sum games in expectation (that
is, before performance) and most (but not all) of these are positive sum
games afterwards. These huge gains constitute a large weight on the
positive side of the social scale. Second, the increases in wealth brought
about by voluntary exchanges have positive external effects on third
parties, by giving them greater opportunities to realize gains from trade.
These two strong systematic effects make it most unwise to invoke
empirical studies to upset these expectations, chiefly by attempting to
10 For a similar view, see Richard Vedder, Wal-Mart, Individuals and the State, 39 CoNN. L. REV.
1725 (2007). Indeed, although the point is not relevant here, if there is some illicit subsidy the first best
course of action is to remove the subsidy, rather than to create a second distortion by adding some
punitive measure to the subsidized firm.
[Vol. 39:1287
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estimate the size of the gains and losses of all possible players in any
particular market niche, either up or down. There are too many collateral
movements in both directions for these effects to offset the two systematic
positives just noted. The proposition here works both ways, because I also
put relatively little stock in empirical studies that try to document the
efficiency of markets by using the same estimation techniques in support
of the opposite conclusion. The reservations about this technique are not
because those demonstrations of market superiority are wrong. Rather, the
uneasiness arises, even though they are likely to be correct, because the
mixed data is likely to be far less persuasive than the basic theoretical
arguments that point in the same direction.
Caution quickly turns to skepticism about empirical demonstrations of
how new entry reduces social welfare because of the total absence of any
theoretical reasoning to support that conclusion. Thus any demonstration
that competitors lose market share is perfectly consistent with the view that
lower prices advance social welfare by releasing resources for deployment
in other areas, where they can work to lower prices, improve products, or
do both. Any empirical studies that show how suppliers of failed
competitors are out of luck usually overlook the increased opportunities
that are available to do business with the ascending firm. And these effects
are powerful. A recent story in the New York Times documents the
enormous shift in automobile employment from the midwest where strong
unions have crippled the operations of Daimler-Chrysler, Ford, and
General Motors to the booming southern states that have embraced foreign
automakers that operate in nonunion environments." Socially, nothing
whatsoever should be done to stop that shift.
Arguments about the global effects of employment practices take that
same form. The theoretical model is clear: any restraints in the form of
maximum or minimum wages prevent the formation of gainful contracts
that would emerge in an unregulated market. That observation should be
the end of the policy story. The efforts to measure some of the
consequences of the innovation will only give a partial picture that
misstates the overall effects. Fewer jobs for the incumbent firms are
balanced out by more jobs with the new entry firms. And similar
arguments can be made about firms that work in adjacent areas, either by
geography or business line. Some direct competitors will lose market
share. But other firms that supply complementary goods will do better by
virtue of the emergence of new industries. Once we move beyond the
immediate parties to the transactions, it is not proper to design an empirical
study that considers only the negatives while ignoring the positives. Nor
11 Micheline Maynard & Nick Bunkley, Trading Places, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2006, at CI,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. The pictures of the Kentucky operations show a recently
renovated restaurant and a thriving bookstore.
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should we support any program that seeks to redress the harms that are
caused by these inevitable shifts in economic fortune. It is suicidally
complex to seek to require transfer payments from those who are helped to
those who are harmed by these multiple and subtle interactions. The
transactions costs overwhelm the entire system and operate as an effective
barrier to entry or change.
Speaking more generally, we should continue to apply to each and
every economic dislocation (positive and negative) the old maxim that they
are damnun absque injuria, or harm without legal injury. Standard modem
economics takes that approach when it treats competitive dislocations as
"pecuniary externalities" that are pointedly ignored in the social welfare
calculus.' 2  These pecuniary losses stand in opposition to "real
externalities," such as the loss from pollution. The terms "pecuniary" and
"real" do more to obscure than reveal. But behind the muddy terminology
lies the critical point that pecuniary externalities are the necessary
byproduct of global moves toward a superior situation whereas real
externalities are not. In light of that distinction, it is wise to concentrate
our legal firepower on checking pollution, ignoring any losses to
individuals who come out second best in the competitive melee. For
competitive externalities, we should rely on the Schumpertarian process of
"creative destruction" that is emblematic of any well-functioning
marketplace. All innovation creates dislocation and losers, so that the best
rule is not to particularize the inquiry to see which forms of economic
dislocation give rise to redressable economic harms, and which ones do
not. In the long run, we will do a far better job at lower cost in making our
judgments about innovation if we follow the basic rule that the full range
of economic affects on third parties at worst wash out, so that the gains
from direct cost reductions and increased trade become decisive. Put
another way, the gains to the parties that participate in new innovation are
such a large thumb on the scale that it is always better to ignore all indirect
external effects, up or down, on third parties. 3 The huge empirical
12 A pecuniary externality
is an externality which operates through prices rather than through real resource
effects. For example, an influx of city-dwellers buying second homes in a rural
area can drive up house prices, making it difficult for young people in the area to get
onto the property ladder. This is in contrast with real externalities which have a
direct resource effect on a third party. For example, pollution from a factory
directly harms the environment. Both pecuniary and real externalities can be either
positive or negative.
Wikipedia.com, Pecuniary Externality, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pecuniary externality (last visited
Jan. 17, 2007); see also Randall G. Holcombe & Russell S. Sobel, Public Policy Toward Pecuniary
Externalities, 29 PUB. FIN. REv. 304, 304 (2001) ("Pecuniary externalities create third-party effects
through changes in relative prices or asset prices. Unlike technological externalities, they do not
misallocate resources and are necessary for the market to work efficiently.").
13 This is a theme that I have stressed elsewhere. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 497-99 (2005); Richard A.
[Vol. 39:1287
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literature on Wal-Mart offers an unintended confirmation of the basic
thesis.
B. The Economic Studies Against Wal-Mart
1. Economic Displacement
The first case in point is one study that purports to find negative
consequences from the possible entry of a new Wal-Mart store into the
Chicago market on Chicago's West Side.' 4 Its authors, Chirag Mehta, Ron
Bainman and Joe Persky, seek to analyze the economic impact that a new
Wal-Mart will have on its existing retailers, which they estimate number
about 763.15 Their initial assumption is that the majority of the job loss
will take place within a three-mile radius of the proposed site. Their study
takes at face value Wal-Mart's claim that its new facility will create 250
new jobs, of which 70% are full time, and will bring in about $600,000 in
annual tax revenue to the city.' 6 Nonetheless, that study concludes that
when the larger picture is reviewed, Wal-Mart's net impact will be a
reduction in local jobs and income that will be offset by a 'slight' increase
in tax revenues. The key assumption for this model is that Wal-Mart is the
"market leader in terms of labor productivity," such that it is able to
generate 51% more sales than its rivals. 17 Therefore the study assumes that
Wal-Mart will use 51% fewer employees to generate the same level of
sales as its competitors. It also assumes that it will attract most of its
customers from within the city, but reclaim only a few of the customers
who go to suburban operations. The study then estimates that the net direct
losses of benefits to Chicago residents will be $851,000, and indirect loss
of benefits will be $332,000.18
None of this evidence offers any reason to displace the assumption that
more efficient production is to be turned aside so that less efficient firms
should be immunized from competition. The first error of these
calculations is to assume that the relevant welfare consequences are limited
only to the City of Chicago. That kind of parochial assumption often leads
to strong protectionist legislation that produces small local gains at the
expense of larger social dislocations elsewhere. A more exhaustive study
would ask whether this Wal-Mart at a minimum creates new opportunities
Epstein, Externalities Everywhere?: Morals and the Police Power, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61,
62-63 (1997).
'" See CHIRAG MEHTA ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WAL-MART: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
WAL-MART STORE PROPOSED FOR CHICAGO'S WEST SIDE 3, 6 (2004), available at http://www.uic.
edu/cuppa/uicued/npublications/recent/nwal-martreport.pdf.
" Id. at 1.
'
6 1d. at3.
7 1d. at4.
Id. at 5.
20071
HeinOnline  -- 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1295 2006-2007
for others that might benefit from the operation, in Chicago or beyond.
Suppliers, shippers and advertisement agents anywhere in the world could
profit from the new store. The object of a sound social policy is to make
sure that local restrictions do not cut down on these benefits. Indeed, the
entire logic of the dormant Commerce Clause is to resist efforts of local
interests to put up arbitrary barriers to interstate commerce.19
Yet even taken within its own terms, the study is ineffective because of
two additional assumptions. The first is the nai've assumption that "Wal-
Mart will use 51 percent fewer employees to generate the same amount of
sales as its competitors., 20  The key point here is that the entire process
should be viewed in dynamic, not static, terms. The lower wages and
higher productivity should allow for an increase in sales above and beyond
those which are made by the existing establishments. There is,
accordingly, no reason to think that the Wal-Mart work force, within
Chicago and beyond, will not respond to the increased demand that lower
prices create. In addition, the higher efficiencies here should put added
pressure on the existing competitors to work harder to reduce their costs
and to expand their opportunities to keep the customers from taking the
Wal-Mart option. Hence, the initial market response should be far more
positive than this study presupposes, and the gains in question should
increase over time-the study wholly ignores the temporal dimension-as
new opportunities are created in the retail sector and elsewhere by the
resources that are released to the economy by these efficient practices.
The second incorrect assumption is that the only impact that Wal-Mart
will have on existing retailers is negative. Why should that be the case?
The increased volume of traffic should open up opportunities for smaller
retailers to enter the market to fill niches too small for Wal-Mart to
colonize. Those positive externalities should also be taken into account.
Other studies have pointed to just these real potential gains. Wal-Mart
commissioned its own study of this question, which concluded that its store
saved working families on average $2329, and created 210,000 jobs in the
United States in 2004.21 More concretely, the study claims that from 1985
until 2004, Wal-Mart was "associated with a cumulative decline of 9.1% in
food-at-home prices, a 4.2% decline in commodities (goods) prices, and a
3.1% decline in overall consumer prices .. ,22 The study also indicates
19 For a good expression of the point, see H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539
(1949). For a textbook example of a horrific scheme of local protectionism that survived judicial
challenges, see City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
20 MEHTA ET AL., supra note 14, at 4.
21 Press Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart Saves Working Families $2,329 Per Year; Has Net
Positive Impact on Real Wages and Job Creation: Conference Discusses Most Authoritative Report to
Date on Wal-Mart's Economic Impact (Nov. 4, 2005), available at http://www.walmartfacts.com/
impact/nov2005_conference_pressIrelease.pdf.
22 GLOBAL INSIGHT, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WAL-MART 1, 3 (2005), available at
http://www.globalinsight.com/publicDownload/genericContent/l 1-03-05_walmart.pdf.
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that nominal wages are 2.2% lower, but given that consumer prices are
3.1% lower, real disposable income is 0.9% higher than it would have been
in a world without Wal-Mart.
23
There is no reason to take this study at face value, of course, but other
studies have pointed in the same direction. For instance, one study found
that bringing Wal-Mart into an urban area spurs the arrival of 12.9 new
stores, and leads to a $56.8 million increase in sales.24 Another study that
focused on South Central Los Angeles concluded that the arrival of a new
Wal-Mart revitalized a poor neighborhood by drawing new shoppers to the
area.25 Once lured in by Wal-Mart, they often spent money at local shops
as well, indicating a clear halo effect.
Finally, a replay of the Chicago incident has occurred in an
economically depressed area of Cleveland. There, a proposed shopping
center with Wal-Mart as its anchor store is estimated to generate $3 million
in property taxes for the city each year, plus $700,000 in payroll taxes.2 6
The shopping center would bring nearly 2000 jobs to the area and would
give the city a chance to reclaim some fraction of the $4 billion that
Cleveland residents spend per year in retail shops-one-third of which
goes to stores outside of Cleveland.27 To no one's surprise, this proposed
Wal-Mart store has met fierce opposition from Cleveland union leaders
and some community groups. More tellingly, it enjoys the support of 78%
of residents (according to one poll).28 Wal-Mart has continued with its
plan to open the store. My sense is that the numbers in all these studies
promise more precision than is attainable. But that is only all the more
reason to stick with the basic presumption that more efficient competitors
produce greater social gains for all-no questions asked.
2. The Antitrust Critique
It is also useful to look at Wal-Mart through the lens of the antitrust
laws, in which the basic objective is to find ways to promote efficient
forms of conduct that do not lead to market arrangements, such as cartels
and monopolies, that work in restraint of trade.29 On this particular score,
it is instructive to look at a recent antitrust attack on Wal-Mart's activities
23 Id.
24 Steve Maich, Why Wal-Mart is Good, MACLEANS.CA, July 25, 2005, available at
http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/business/article.jsp?content-20050725_109503 109503.
25 See Robert McNatt et al., Who Says Wal-Mart is Bad for Cities?, BUS. WK., May 10, 2004, at
77, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File.
26 Maich, supra note 24.
27 Id.
28 id.
29 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 13-14
(2005).
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written by Barry C. Lynn of the New America Foundation,3 ° which shows
again just how easy it is to go off the rails. The essence of Lynn's attack is
that Wal-Mart plays too tough with its suppliers-pity Kraft and Coca-
Cola-and customers, so that its break up is necessary in order to allow
them the breathing room to remain viable enterprises that can escape
bankruptcy's unhappy fate. Lynn's basic claim is that political control is
needed to counteract the dominant influence that one firm exercises over
the retail market. Markets must be subservient to democratic control, not
independent of it. Lynn writes: "We must restore antitrust law to its
central role in protecting the economic rights, properties, and liberties of
the American citizen, and first of all use that power to break Wal-Mart into
pieces.''
Which pieces, or how many, is never said. And for good reason
because the antitrust laws do not support this radical contention. The basic
system of antitrust law is divided into two parts, and the Wal-Mart case fits
into neither. The first situation involves cases where parties enter into
some contract or other business arrangement whereby they restrict output,
raise prices or divide territories. In each of these situations, the case for
regulation does not rely on some vague conception of pecuniary
externalities. It is now possible to give a precise demonstration that the
proposed arrangement flunks the best test of economic efficiency that Lynn
first decries and then misapplies.32 All these strategies result in losses to
consumers that are systematically larger than the gains to the producers, by
knocking out mutually beneficial transactions in which the buyer's
reservation price is somewhere below the monopoly price and above the
competitive one.
Given the high administrative and error costs that plague the entire
operation, it is an open question whether the effort to identify and isolate
these cases is a game that is worth the candle. I have expressed many
doubts about the wisdom of having any antitrust law at all, 33 and, more
recently, about overreaching consent decrees that have resulted from the
government efforts to break up various businesses.34 But whether those
30 Barry C. Lynn, Breaking the Chain: The Antitrust Case Against Wal-Mart, HARPER'S MAG.,
July 2006, at 29-30. For an all-out attack on Lynn, see Thomas DiLorenzo, Should Wal-Mart Be
Broken Up?, LUDWIG VON MISES INST., July 19, 2006, http://www.mises.org/story/2248.
31 Lynn, supra note 30, at 36.
32 Wal-Mart is
programmed to cut cost faster than price, to slow the introduction of new
technologies and techniques, to dictate downward the wages and profits of the
millions of people and smaller firms who make and grow what they sell, to break
down entire lines of production in the name of efficiency.
Id.
33 Richard A. Epstein, Private Property and the Public Domain: The Case ofAntitrust, in ETHICS,
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 48, 52-53, 55 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
34 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: WHY LESS IS
MORE 5-14, 112-15 (2007).
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criticisms are sound, at least it is possible to understand what objectives the
government hopes to achieve in going after these institutional
arrangements. It is of course beyond dispute that Wal-Mart has not run
afoul of any of these provisions. It has always gone alone in opposition to
its competition-not in cooperation with them-either by agreement, or
acquisition or merger. We do not have to face the question, which often
arises in merger contexts, of whether the efficiencies of the new operation
provide a social benefit greater than the loss in social welfare attributable
to higher market concentration.
The second half of the antitrust law is much more difficult to pin
down, for it seeks, with evident difficulty, to identify those unilateral
practices of a dominant firm that are likely to create long-run inefficiencies
in the marketplace.35 The area of unilateral practices can include such
tactics as tie-in sales, exclusive dealing arrangements, bundling and
predation. Yet in all three of these situations, the analysis is beset with one
overhanging complexity. Each of these various practices does not lie
within the exclusive province of the dominant firm. Any firm can, and
many firms do, practice these various techniques in order to expand their
position in the marketplace. They do so because of the efficiency of the
underlying arrangements, which leaves open the real question of whether it
makes sense to stop dominant firms from engaging in these various
practices, so that they have to yield ground to their rivals.
But once again, Wal-Mart does not come within a thousand miles of
these particular antitrust strictures. Start with one key number in the Wal-
Mart equation. Wal-Mart's profits as a percentage of gross sales equal
3.5%, which hardly suggests that it exploits anyone. Of course it works, as
an agent for its customers, to pay rock bottom prices to its suppliers and
employees. But those benefits are passed right on to customers. Its
consistent low margins are what we expect from the firm. There is no hint
that Wal-Mart sells below cost, or that it would have a ghost of a chance of
surviving if it took that foolish a step in a crowded a market. It has no
fancy tie-ins or exclusives, and it does not offer any odd sales packages
that could (even if they shouldn't) draw the attention or ire of the antitrust
sleuths.
There is good reason, then, why no government official and no private
lawyer has tried a hand at the antitrust option. It simply does not work.
And what is its underlying assumption? The same as above. The firm that
succeeds through internal growth and price superiority does exactly as we
35 For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing Field? The New
Antitrust Paradox, 72 U. CIii. L. REV. 49, 49-72 (2005).
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should all hope.36 There is never in these cases any effort to focus on the
position of individual competitors or customers, as Lynn seeks to do.
There is rather the proper faith that the direct gains matter, and that the
indirect consequences on net are likely to be positive as well. This sensible
view then avoids the huge cost of a futile effort at breaking up Wal-Mart
into arbitrary pieces that are less likely to function well. New entry here,
as in other contexts, is the best remedy against various forms of abuse.
3. The Minimum Wage
The second line of attack on Wal-Mart is less global. Now Wal-Mart's
supposed exploitation is not perpetrated on Fortune 500 companies, but
against the unskilled and often uneducated workers whom Wal-Mart hires.
The animosity is surely driven up a notch by the company's unyielding
opposition to unions, which it (rightly) thinks will destroy the flexibility
and cost structure that it needs to survive. Since there are reports that Wal-
Mart shuts down any unit that unionizes in the United States or Canada, it
is easy to see what stimulates the opposition.37 One way of course to limit
Wal-Mart's ability to control its own destiny is to increase the minimum
wage laws, either selectively for big-box companies, or, if that fails, across
the board. The key question is what justifies this interference.
As a matter of first principle, the argument against the minimum wage
law is, I think, conclusive, and works on the same generalized principles
that were noted above. The free movement of firms and workers in and
out of the market generates the great social surplus. Set a minimum wage
law that is below the market price, and it will have no effect, save as an
annoyance. Set it above, and the supply of workers at the stipulated price
is greater than the demand, so that some mutual beneficial exchanges are
blocked. The exact empirical effects of the minimum wage laws are
difficult to study, because of the constant efforts of both sides to evade
them, as for example, by such expedients as working part time "off the
clock." But in the midst of these difficulties, the most obvious
conclusion-an increase in unemployment rates-represents a serious
oversimplification of the actual forms of market response.
Contracts do not have a single dimension of wages. Rather, the wage
term is one of a diverse package of terms and conditions, some explicit,
some implicit, which spans a range of issues that are hard to list in full.
Some of the obvious candidates include the number, days, and duration of
shifts; location of work; training on the job; prospects for future
36 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). For discussion, see
Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing
the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 9-10 (2003).
37 For a discussion of Wal-Mart's anti-union efforts in Canada, see John Stout & Jo-Anne Pickle,
The Wal-Mart Waltz in Canada: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1493 (2007).
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employment; the provision of rest areas, showers and other amenities;
fringe benefits; vacation and sick leave policy; and the prospect of future
promotion. The market wage thus represents the wage given for a contract
whose other attributes have been set to maximize joint gains. There is no
reason why any particular bundle of attributes has to have the same weight
across firms, or the same weight for different individuals working at the
same firm. For example, if two workers are offered identical packages, the
one who lives nearer to the job is more likely to take it, and so on.
The key empirical question is what modification will be made on these
collateral terms when the minimum wage is fixed by law above the market-
clearing price. The answer is that these terms will shift in favor of the
employer in order to offset the government-mandated wage increment.
That shift, however, will on balance, still leave the pool of employers and
employees worse off than before where it is difficult in the abstract to
decide whether the employer or the employee has taken the greater hit
from the imposition. But any estimated reduction in jobs is likely to be
smaller than intuitively expected because of the ability of the parties to
adapt their behavior along other margins. It follows therefore that the
social loss from the regulation is not measured as a first approximation
solely by the reduction in jobs. One must add to that figure the
unambiguous reduction in employer and employee surplus that comes from
the alteration in private contract terms in less satisfactory ways to reduce
the impact of the minimum wage.
It is now necessary to determine the relative importance of the two
different kinds of adjustments: firing (or not hiring new) workers versus
alteration of contract terms. The answer in theory is this: the smaller the
deviation between the market wage and the minimum wage, the more
likely it is that the parties will make some (loss-mitigating) contract
adjustments short of actual firing (or not hiring). Yet the higher the
minimum wage, the less effective these devices are, so the greater the loss
in jobs. If the increase in the minimum wage is too high, the particular
labor market will shut down because all the opportunities for trade are
blocked. That truth is in reality denied by no one. Yet the question is what
that concession tells us about the desirability of smaller shifts in the
minimum wage laws. Most simply, if minimum wage regulation imposes
unambiguous welfare losses at high levels, at what level, and for what
reason, should we expect it to generate social gains at lower levels? It is
no mean feat to generate such an explanation because it requires a shift not
only in the magnitude of certain effects, but also in their direction. The
more obvious conclusion is that the lower the minimum wage, the fewer
labor market distortions it creates.
What is so striking in the current debate over the minimum wage is
that no one who defends today's highly fashionable increases has offered
any theoretical explanation of why small increases in the minimum wage
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are good while larger ones are bad. At this point, two questions remain to
be answered. The first is how do the proponents of the minimum wage
decide what increment they think to be appropriate. The second is whether
they can adduce any empirical evidence that falsifies the standard
assumption of pro-market economists that the minimum wage is routinely
inimical to social welfare.
The first question is difficult to answer because there are so many
different groups that are pushing hard for an increase in the minimum
wage. Some of these supporters simply deny the force of the standard
prediction of welfare losses from wage barriers in labor markets. They
believe that firms are bluffing politically when they claim that they cannot
pay more; or they assume that so long as all firms are subject to the same
restriction, the minimum wage will change the wage level, but not the
number or types of jobs. Their implicit view is that no one should worry
so long as the wage increase hits all firms equally. These assumptions are
in fact wrong. There is little to bluff about when labor is mobile, and
employers face tough business constraints. In this context it is worth
noting that the average income per employee at Wal-Mart is around $6000
per year, which means that if all 1,800,000 workers received only a dollar
more per hour, about 25% of the net profit would be gone, and we have a
different business to say the least.
38
More generally, minimum wage laws never hit all firms in the same
way, even with their uniform facial impact. Some firms use higher skilled
workers than others, and hence are less likely to be hurt by the increased
wages. Indeed, they could well be benefited because the minimum wage
hobbles their competitors more than themselves. Similarly, some firms
will find it easier than others to shift to more capital investments, which
will create distortions. It is therefore no argument in favor of the minimum
wage to say that some firms benefit after its passage. That argument
carries no more weight than the observation that protective tariffs increase
the revenues of some firms. Finally, even if all firms were in the same
position (which they are not), the minimum wage would still hurt the
overall social position. The shortage of jobs and the shift to inferior
contract terms would not disappear. The perfect parity only means that in
this rarified world the social losses are evenly distributed, and not oddly
skewed.
Once the theoretical conceptions of the minimum wage law are laid
bare, it becomes necessary to look elsewhere to find out how the
proponents of minimum wage laws propose to set the number. In this vein,
it is no accident that the chief financial backers of the anti-Wal-Mart
groups are key service sector unions that have tried without success to
38 Maich, supra note 24.
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organize Wal-Mart's employees. Their private calculations have nothing
to do with overall social welfare. Rather, the one question they ask is what
minimum wage law will give them a comparative advantage against
nonunion competitors such as Wal-Mart. Viewed from this partisan
perspective, it now becomes possible to explain why small increases in the
minimum wage law are good when large increases are bad. The small
increases have a differential impact insofar as they are higher than the Wal-
Mart wage but lower than the non-union wage. At this point the
differential impact of the neutral law should be evident to us all. Yet the
proponents of the modest increase in minimum wages will fight fiercely
against a law that sets the minimum wage above the union wage-a
scenario that is so destructive that no one on any side of the political
spectrum supports it. Subsequently, in all political settings the battles over
the minimum wage law come in small increments, which is why its dire
effects on unemployment are not seen, but some adaptive responses on
other contract terms remain possible. The point here is not that everyone
thinks that minimum wage laws have no effect on employment levels. It is
rather that everyone knows minimum wage laws have such an effect,
especially when the leaps in the minimum wages are large.
So what then is the evidence on this? Here I will not look at the reams
of evidence that point out the downside of the minimum wage law. Rather,
space permits me to look only at one study that purports to find that the
proposed levels of minimum wage increases in two cities-San Francisco
and Santa Fe-have had no real effects on any of the variables that
economists like to measure. Total level of employment, total number of
firms, exits and bankruptcies show only statistically insignificant changes.
The argument here has been touted as a refutation of the traditional view
that the minimum wage causes job loss, because of the inability to find any
real market effects on any of the standard measures from increases that are
higher than those contemplated by federal law. There is, however, a
simpler explanation. The minimum wage law only bites when it is set
above the market wage. San Francisco and Santa Fe are expensive places
to live, and both have educated workforces. 39 The simplest explanation for
this set of non-findings therefore is that the market wage is in fact above
the minimum wage. The study did not check to see if this is true. But it
does offer one clue that it is. For example, in its new store in San
Francisco, Home Depot set wages at $10.77 per hour, which is above the
local minimum. 40  The easiest explanation is that this wage figure
represents the market wage. And remember these regional variations are
39 See ARINDRAJIT DUBE ET AL., lR POLICY BRIEF, Do BUSINESSES FLEE CITYWIDE MINIMUM
WAGES? EVIDENCE FROM SAN FRANCISCO AND SANTA FE 1 (2006), available at http://www.iir.
berkeley.edu/research/minwage_sfandsantafe.pdf.40 Id. at 3.
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yet another reason why national minimum wage laws don't make sense.
They impact low wage and depressed areas far more than prosperous ones.
In short, when it comes to the minimum wage, the unions and the activists
are wrong. Wal-Mart is the source of opportunity. Its opponents block
opportunities. They do not create them.
III. A CLASH OF WORLD VISIONS
The deep divisions that separate the two sides on the Wal-Mart
struggle are indicative of deep philosophical differences that cover this
particular issue, but also range far beyond. In this brief conclusion, let me
outline one of the key differences: this difference relates to whether we
care more about growing the pie or evening up the size of the slices. The
former attitude is doubtless held by most of the defenders of laissez-faire,
and the union members and activists congregate at the opposite pole.
There is a brute inner logic to both positions. Those of us on the laissez-
faire side think that free entry will not only produce the larger pie but will
help with income distribution in the long run, by allowing free entry to
control against undue market profits. On the other side, the egalitarians
typically think that programs of wealth redistribution do not have much
adverse effect on productivity, so they don't see what they are giving up in
output in order to achieve their own objective of flattening the income
distribution.
It is worth probing the two strikingly different attitudes toward income
inequality a bit more. Those like myself who come from the broad
utilitarian tradition are often drawn to the standard that looks for Pareto
improvements. Thus if one person is left better off, and no one else is left
worse off, then the new distribution of wealth counts as an improvement
over the old one. By that standard, any increase in wealth to the rich and
famous counts as a social improvement even if the wealth of all other
individuals remains static. Any increase in the differences in wealth
between persons is welcome so long as it does not compromise the welfare
of others. Indeed, even by the weaker Kaldor-Hicks criterion-when the
gains to the wealthy are sufficient to buy off the losses to the poor-there
is a social improvement with greater wealth, even if the transfer payments
are not made. Yet the differences between the two standards should not be
allowed to conceal one point they share in common. Neither test tolerates
any overall decreases in wealth-which means that both tests in like
fashion rule out an impressive number of influential social initiatives,
including the various attacks on Wal-Mart. In addition, Kaldor-Hicks
actually tolerates even larger differentials in wealth so long as this criterion
is met, just as it permits narrowing of the gaps between rich and poor so
long as overall wealth is not compromised.
Egalitarians take a very different view on this question. In their eyes,
the skew in the distribution of wealth counts as much as the sum. Hence
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they have deep suspicion of any change in relative wealth (including those
changes that meet the standards for both Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks
improvements) that accentuates the differences of wealth between rich and
poor. In large measure their argument rests on the deep sense that
redistribution (if it resulted in no loss of output) toward greater income
equality is welcome because of the diminishing marginal utility of
wealth-a point on which they have strong intuitive appeal. Once that
principle is accepted, then the utility gains from some redistribution can
justify some overall reduction in wealth. Thus, having the rich get richer is
bad if the poor remain in the same position given the greater gaps in wealth
that necessarily ensue.
In a highly schematic way, which does not affect the basic argument,
assume that the world is divided into two perfectly homogenous groups,
one rich (R) and one poor (P). If at the outset the income of the Rs was all
100 and that of the Ps was all 10, the believer in Pareto improvements
would prefer a distribution of 1000 for each R and 10 to each P, if there
were no other changes. It would be an open question whether he would
prefer 1000 to R and 10 to P to a distribution that left R at 100 but
increased P to 50. The egalitarian would have real doubts about the move
from (100, 10) to (1000, 10), and at some point would prefer either the
status quo or a third choice that results in a larger proportionate increase
(such as 500, 50) instead of a still larger disproportionate one. Indeed,
some egalitarians might prefer a new distribution of (80, 20), which has
both a smaller skew but a lower total value.
The theoretical disputations have differential consequences for the two
approaches. No matter how one slices the numbers, all voluntary market
transactions meet the Pareto test between the participants even if we have
no knowledge of the initial or final endowments of either parties to the
transaction. It is enough to know that the standard rule of voluntary
exchanges yields gains from trades. The question of distribution can take
care of itself. But the egalitarian cannot adopt that agnostic position-he
must always make some estimate about whether a possible increase in the
skew justifies some restriction on market behavior. His judgments raise
much greater difficulties on two levels: first, setting out the permissible
moves from the full set of initial distributions; and second, trying to figure
out how to evaluate these matters. On the first, there is no practical way to
determine the relative gains to the parties, since these are routinely
unobserved. On the second, there will be a real difficulty in deciding just
how much wealth should be sacrificed for an improvement in overall
equality. The approach of tinkering with literally billions of contracts is
thus overwhelmed by both normative and practical concerns.
In light of these difficulties, a consistent egalitarian will look for a
different way to deal with wealth differentials. Most notably, for all its
difficulties, a system of progressive taxation looks to be a far less intrusive
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way to balance off wealth against equality.41 But that tax, without more,
does not reach individuals who are outside the wealth system. Hence,
some form of government democrat that declines with income is the only
way to reach all sectors of the population-at a major administrative cost.
But neither of these initiatives involves the direct form of attacks on Wal-
Mart. Rather they treat the case for redistribution the same for all persons,
regardless of their status, by looking only at their relative wealth. They
therefore do not support the strong market interferences that are
characterized in the anti-Wal-Mart campaign, which, as noted earlier, are
better explained as an effort of organized labor to preserve high wage jobs
by legal interference that selectively blocks their low wage competitors.
The surprising implication of all this analysis is that Wal-Mart comes out
relatively unscathed even under an egalitarian critique, which at its best
tries to preserve the efficiency of market transactions by using tax devices
to moderate differences in wealth. In the end I think that this tax approach
itself has serious drawbacks, as I have long been a supporter of the flat
tax.42 But that debate gets us out of the world of Wal-Mart, to which this
symposium is devoted. For our purposes, it is hard to find a coherent
approach to social welfare or social justice that lends credence to the
virulent attacks that are aimed at Wal-Mart. The proper social response to
Wal-Mart seems clear-do nothing to either help or hurt it; and then wish
it and its competitors the best of luck.
41 For discussion, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
821, 821 (2000).
42 See Richard A. Epstein, Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 140, 171
(2002); Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 49, 74 (1986).
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